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Abstract It is known how to transform certain canonical three-pass identification
schemes into signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir transform. Pointcheval and
Stern showed that those schemes are existentially unforgeable in the random-oracle
model leveraging the, at that time, novel forking lemma. Recently, a number of
5-pass identification protocols have been proposed. Extending the above technique
to capture 5-pass identification schemes would allow to obtain novel unforgeable
signature schemes. In this paper, we provide an extension of the forking lemma
(and the Fiat-Shamir transform) in order to assess the security of what we call n-
generic signature schemes. These include signature schemes that are derived from
certain (2n+ 1)-pass identification schemes. In doing so, we put forward a generic
methodology for proving the security of a number of signature schemes derived
from (2n + 1)-pass identification schemes for n ≥ 2. As an application of this
methodology, we obtain two new code-based existentially-unforgeable signature
schemes, along with a security reduction. In particular, we solve an open problem
in multivariate cryptography posed by Sakumoto, Shirai and Hiwatari at CRYPTO
2011.
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1 Introduction
The focus of this work is on methodologies to prove the security of digital signature
schemes. Thus, instead of providing security reductions from scratch, the goal
is to provide security arguments for a class of signature schemes, as previously
done in [21,22,18,1,28]. In particular, we aim at extending a pioneering work by
Pointcheval and Stern [21] where a reduction technique was introduced to obtain
security arguments for the so-called generic signature schemes. These security
arguments allow for simple proofs and for efficient signature schemes. Moreover,
this type of signature schemes can be derived from identification schemes if the
latter satisfy certain requirements.
Generic Signature Schemes. Pointcheval and Stern call generic signature schemes
those whose signatures are of the form σ = (σ0, h1, σ1), where σ0 is uniformly
distributed over a large set, h1 = H(m,σ0) with H being a hash function modeled
as a random oracle, m being the message to be signed and σ1 depends merely on
σ0 and h1 (and, obviously, on the secret key of the signature scheme).
The works [21,22] provide security arguments for generic signature schemes
thanks to the use of the forking lemma. This lemma states that a successful forger
can be reinvoked with a different random oracle in order to get two distinct but
related forgeries. If the generic signature schemes additionally enjoy the existence
of a polynomial-time algorithm, called extractor, that recovers the signing key
from two signatures σ = (σ0, h1, σ1) and σ
′ = (σ0, h′1, σ
′
1) on the same message
with h1 6= h′1, then unforgeability is guaranteed under a certain computational
assumption. For instance, signature schemes obtained from Σ-protocols fall into
this category, thanks to the special soundness property of the latter [9].
Unfortunately, the above framework has only addressed 3-tupled generic sig-
natures (3-pass identification schemes). An extension of the forking lemma for
signatures of the form (σ0, h1, σ1, . . . , hn, σn), where hi = Hi(m,σ0, h1, σ1, . . . ,
hi−1, σi−1) for n ∈ N, would allow to address a greater class of signatures. Roughly
speaking, n-generic signature schemes are built as generic signature schemes but
are not restricted in the number of tuple entries as mentioned above.
From Identification Schemes to Signature Schemes. One way to build a signature
scheme (in the random-oracle model) is to depart from an existing identification
protocol and convert it into a signature scheme using the well-known Fiat-Shamir
(FS) paradigm [12].1 In an identification protocol a series of messages are ex-
changed between two parties, called prover and verifier, in order to enable a prover
to convince a verifier that it knows a given secret. Zero-knowledge identification
protocols [16] convince a verifier without revealing any other information whatso-
ever about the secret itself. Informally, the FS paradigm builds a signature scheme
as the transcript of one execution of the identification scheme, where the verifier’s
1 Alternatively, one could use Fischlin’s transformation [13] in order to derive signature
schemes. A comparison between Fiat-Shamir and Fischlin’s transformation can be found in [11]
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challenges are replaced by the outputs of a secure hash function on input the
message and the current transcript.
In [21] the signatures obtained by applying the FS transform to canonical
identification schemes were called generic signatures schemes. Schematically, in a
canonical identification scheme a prover starts the interaction by sending a com-
mitment Com, then it receives a challenge Ch drawn from a uniform distribution
by the verifier, and it finishes the interaction with a message, called response Rsp.
Finally, the verifier runs a verifying algorithm determining acceptance or rejection.
In addition, the identification protocol needs to satisfy special soundness. Roughly
speaking, special soundness means that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm
which is able to extract the witness of the prover, given two correlated transcripts
(Com,Ch,Rsp), (Com,Ch′,Rsp′) with Ch 6= Ch′.
Many zero-knowledge identification schemes have been proposed whose conver-
sion to signature schemes lead to generic signature schemes [12,14,26]. However,
5-pass identification protocols are not covered by the abstraction above. Thus, we
do not know whether a generalization of the Fiat-Shamir transform to 5-pass iden-
tification schemes would give raise to unforgeable signature schemes. We are then
obliged to prove the security of those signatures schemes from scratch. Examples
of schemes falling outside the Pointcheval-Stern framework can be found in [7,
25,26,8,19,20,24,17,27]. The authors must provide direct proofs for the signature
schemes in these works deriving from their 5-pass identification protocols. These
proofs are often quite complex. Moreover, the authors of [23] left open the problem
of finding a security reduction for the signature scheme derived from their newly
introduced 5-pass identification protocol.
Our Contributions. Firstly, we provide an extension of the forking lemma for
signatures of the form (σ0, h1, σ1, . . . , hn, σn), where hi = Hi(m,σ0, h1, σ1, . . . ,
hi−1, σi−1) for n ∈ N, that we call n-generic signatures. This definition poten-
tially allows us to capture signature schemes obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir
transformation to n-pass identification schemes. Roughly speaking, n-generic sig-
nature schemes are built as generic signature schemes but are not restricted in
the number of entries. Our extension of the forking lemma (Theorem 1, Section
3) states that from an adversary A that with non-negligible probability finds a
forgery σ = (σ0, h1, σ1, . . . , hn, σn) on message m it can be obtained (by rewind-
ing) another adversary A′ that obtains a forgery σ′ = (σ0, h1, σ1, . . . , h′n, σ′n) on
m with hn 6= h′n. We give evidence that 5-pass identification schemes give raise to
2-generic signature schemes
Secondly, we continue by identifying a property, which we call 2-soundness,
that can be used to prove the unforgeability of 2-generic signatures schemes sat-
isfying it. This property is satisfied by the signature schemes obtained by ap-
plying the extended Fiat-Shamir Transform to the 5-pass identification schemes
[8,23]. Informally, 2-soundness means that the signing key sk can be extracted
from 4 correlated valid signatures on the same message m of the form σ(1) =
(σ0, h1, σ1, h
(1)
2 , σ
(1)
2 ), σ
(2) = (σ0, h
′
1, σ
′
1, h
(2)
2 , σ
(2)
2 ) with h1 6= h′1, σ1 6= σ′1, and
σ(3) = (σ0, h1, σ1, h
(3)
2 , σ
(3)
2 ), σ
(4) = (σ0, h
′
1, σ
′
1, h
(4)
2 , σ
(4)
2 ) with h
(2)
2 6= h(4)2 , σ(2)2 6=
σ
(4)
2 and h
(1)
2 6= h(3)2 , σ(1)2 6= σ(3)2 .
Thirdly, we are able to generalize 2-soundness to n-soundness. Roughly speak-
ing, n-soundness requires that a valid signing key sk can be extracted from 2n
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distinct but correlated signatures on the same message m. Through our Nested
Forking Lemma (Theorem 2, Section 4) we are able to leverage our Extended Fork-
ing Lemma to show that any forger against an n-generic signature scheme can be
recursively run 2n times to obtain 2n signatures as required by n-soundness, for n
logarithmically upper-bounded in the security parameter.
Fourthly and lastly, we give two concrete instantiations in our framework. With
our first instantiation, we solve an open problem in multivariate cryptography,
by showing in Section 5 that our methodology encompasses the signature scheme
suggested by Sakumoto, Shirai and Hiwatari [23] at CRYPTO 2011. Such a security
statement was missing in [23] and was left as an open problem by the authors.
We provide an additional second existentially unforgeable signature scheme, by
applying our framework to the 5-pass code based identification scheme proposed
by Cayrel, El Yousfi Alaoui and Ve´ron in [8].
Related Work. Pointcheval and Stern [21,22] provide security arguments for generic
signature schemes. The latter are restrictive in the sense that (a) they allow trans-
formations only based on canonical identification schemes, and (b) the existence of
an extractor is required. The work of Abdalla et al. [1] introduced a new transfor-
mation from identification schemes (IS) to signature schemes (SS) without insisting
on the existence of such an extractor. Nonetheless, they require again canonical
IS. Ohta and Okamoto [18] assume that the IS is honest-verifier (perfect) zero-
knowledge and that it is computationally infeasible for a cheating prover to con-
vince the verifier to accept. Again, this result is valid only for three-pass IS.
Security arguments for the FS transformation in the standard model can be
found in [15,5]. Moreover, the security of the FS transform against quantum ad-
versaries in the quantum random oracle model [6] is investigated in [10]. In [4],
Bellare and Neven stated the forking lemma in a generalized way merely looking
at the output behavior of an algorithm if it is run twice on related inputs. They
decouple the notion of forking lemma from signature schemes.
Previous Conference Version. This work is based on the contents of a previous
conference publication by the authors [3]. We point out that the security arguments
sketched in our previous work for the signature scheme by Sakumoto, Shirai and
Hiwatari were flawed. Indeed, we claimed that 2 forgeries on the same message
m were enough to recover the underlying secret key, while the proof of knowledge
argument given in [23] requires in fact 4 such forgeries. To fix our previous security
argument we have introduced the Nested Forking Lemma in Section 4, which
indeed works for any n-signature for n ≥ 1.
Organization. We introduce in Section 2 the technical machinery needed to state
and prove our results. In Section 3 we present the notion of n-generic signature
schemes and provide an extended forking lemma that applies to this new signature
class. We state and prove in Section 4 the Nested Forking Lemma. In Sections 5
we apply our paradigm and derive two new provably secure 2-generic signature
schemes; one based on multivariate polynomials and another one based on q-ary
codes.
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2 Preliminaries
We begin by introducing some notations and briefly reviewing some definitions. A
function µ(·) is negligible in n, or just negligible, if for every positive polynomial p(·)
and all sufficiently large n it holds that µ(n) < 1/p(n). Otherwise, we call µ(·)
non-negligible. Note that the sum of two negligible functions (resp. non-negligible)
is again negligible (resp. non-negligible) whereas the sum of one non-negligible
function pi(·) and one negligible function µ(·) is non-negligible, i.e. there exists a
positive polynomial p(·) such that for infinitely many n’s it holds that pi(n)+µ(n) >
1/p(n).
Two distributions ensembles {Xn}n∈N and {Yn}n∈N are said to be (computa-
tionally) indistinguishable, if for every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm D,
there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that
|Pr[D(Xn) = 1]− Pr[D(Yn) = 1]| ≤ µ(n) .
A random variable X has min-entropy k, denoted H∞(X) = k, if
maxx Pr[X = x] = 2
−k.
We write s
$←− AO(x) to denote the output s by a probabilistic algorithm A
with input x having black-box access to an oracle O. In particular, this means,
that A may query oracle O in order to derive s from its answers. An algorithm
A is probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if A is randomized and for any input
x ∈ {0, 1}∗ the computation of A(x) terminates in at most poly(|x|) steps.
Digital Signatures. In the following we give the definition of a signature scheme
together with the corresponding standard security level.
Definition 1 (Signature scheme) A signature scheme is a collection of the
following algorithms S = (KGen,Sign,Vf) defined as follows.
KGen(1κ) is a probabilistic algorithm which, on input a security parameter 1κ,
outputs a secret and a public key (sk, pk).
Sign(sk,m) is a probabilistic algorithm which, on input a secret key sk and a
message m, outputs a signature σ.
Vf(pk,m, σ) is a deterministic algorithm which, on input a public key pk, a mes-
sage m and a signature σ, outputs either 1 (= valid) or 0 (= invalid).
We require correctness of the verification, i.e., the verifier will always accept gen-
uine signatures. More formally, for all (sk, pk) ← KGen(1κ), any message m, any
σ ← Sign(sk,m), we always have Vf(pk,m, σ) = 1. This requirement can be relaxed
to hold only with overwhelming probability.
Additionally we assume the existence of an algorithm Test(pk, sk) such that it
outputs 1 iff (sk, pk) belongs to the output space KGen(1κ). This requirement can
be relaxed to hold only with overwhelming probability.
From signature schemes we require that no outsider should be able to forge a
signer’s signature. The following definition captures this property formally.
Definition 2 (Unforgeability of a Signature Scheme) A signature scheme
S = (KGen, Sign,Vf) is existentially unforgeable under (adaptively) chosen-message
attacks if for any PPT algorithm A making at most qs queries to oracle OSign,
the probability that the following experiment returns 1 is negligible:
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Experiment UnforgeabilitySA(κ)
(sk, pk)
$←− KGen(1κ)
(σ∗,m∗) $←− AOSign(pk)
OSign(·) on input m outputs σ $←− Sign(sk,m)
Return 1 iff
Vf(pk,m∗, σ∗) = 1 and m∗ was not queried to OSign(·) by A
The probability is taken over all coin tosses of KGen, Sign, and A.
Note that qs is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter κ. Definition 2
captures unforgeability against adaptively chosen-message attacks for signature
schemes. Unforgeability against no-message attacks is obtained from the above by
setting qs = 0.
Splitting Lemma. The following lemma is extensively used in the forking lemma
proofs. It states that one can split a given set X into two subsets, (a) a non-
negligible subset Ω consisting of “good” x’s which provides a non-negligible prob-
ability of success over y, and (b) its complement, consisting of “bad” x’s.
Lemma 1 (Splitting Lemma [21, Lemma 3]) Let A be a subset of X × Y
such that Pr[A(x, y)] ≥ , then there exist Ω ⊂ X such that
1. Pr [x ∈ Ω] ≥ /2
2. If a ∈ Ω, then Pr[A(a, y)] ≥ /2.
3 Extended Forking Lemma
In this section we give the formal definition of an n-generic signature scheme and
extend the forking lemma accordingly.
3.1 n-Generic Signature Schemes
Let Hi denote a hash function with output of cardinality 2
κi (where each κi can
be written as a polynomial in the security parameter κ).
Definition 3 (n-Generic Signature Scheme) Let S = (KGen,Sign,Vf) be a
signature scheme with an additional algorithm Test such that Pr[Test(pk, sk) =
1 : ∃r s.t. (pk, sk) ← KGen(κ; r)] = 1 (except for negligible probability). We say
that S is a n-generic signature scheme if the following properties are satisfied:
Structure. A signature σ for a message m is of the form (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn)
where h1 = H1(m,σ0) and hi = Hi(m,σ0, . . . , hi−1, σi−1) for i = 2, . . . , n
with Hi being modeled as a random oracle. Each σi can depend on previous
signature blocks σ0, . . . , σi−1 and hash values h1, . . . , hi for i = 1, . . . , n (and,
obviously, also from public and secret key of the signer). We require that the
min-entropy of the random variable which outputs σ0, . . . , σn−1 must be in
ω(|Hn|).2
2 This requirement is necessary for Lemma 3.
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Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge (HVZK). Assume the hash functions Hi are in-
stantiated via publicly accessible random oracles. There exists a PPT algo-
rithm Z, the zero-knowledge simulator, controlling the random oracles, such
that for any pair of PPT algorithms D = (D0, D1) the following distributions
are computationally indistinguishable:
– Let (pk, sk,m, state) ← D0(1κ). If Test(pk, sk) = 1, then set σ := (σ0, h1,
. . . , σn−1, hn, σn)← Sign(sk,m); else σ ← ⊥. Output D1(σ, state).
– Let (pk, sk,m, state) ← D0(1κ). If Test(pk, sk) = 1, then set σ := (σ0, h1,
. . . , σn−1, hn, σn)← Z(pk,m, 1); else σ ← Z(pk,m, 0). OutputD1(σ, state).
Notice that the structure of a generic signature as originally proposed in [21]
matches that of a 1-generic signature following our definition. We occasionally
write σ = (σ0, σ1, . . . , σn, h1 . . . , hn) instead of (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn) for the
sake of readability.
In the following we show that, perhaps surprisingly, every n-generic signature
scheme can actually be seen as a (n−1)-generic signature scheme. We will heavily
use this fact in the proof of the Nested Forking Lemma (Theorem 2, Section 4).
Lemma 2 (n-generic signature ⇒ (n− 1)-generic signature) Let S be a n-
generic signature scheme outputting signatures of the form σ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1,
hn, σn). Let S
† be the signature scheme obtained from S by setting the output
signatures σ† to be σ† = (σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σ†n−1), where σ
†
n−1 := (σn−1, hn, σn).
Then S† is a (n− 1)-generic signature scheme.
Proof It is easy to see that:
– S† has the structure of a (n−1)-generic signature scheme if S has the structure
of a n-generic signature scheme;
– S† has the honest-verifier zero-knowledge if σ does. Indeed, define Z†(pk,m, 1) :=
(σ0, h1, . . . , σ
†
n−1), where σ := (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn)← Z(pk,m, 1). uunionsq
3.2 An Extended Forking Lemma – No-Message Attack Model
Pointcheval and Stern introduced in [21] the forking lemma as a technique to
prove the security of some families of signature schemes, namely generic signature
schemes with special soundness. This well-known lemma is applied to get two
forgeries for the same message using a replay attack. After that, one can use those
two forgeries to recover the secret key. They also show that a successful forger
in the adaptive chosen-message attack model implies a successful forger in the
no-message attack model, as long as the honest-verifier zero-knowledge property
holds. In the following we propose an extension of the original forking lemma
that can be applied to n-generic signature schemes. We first provide the Extended
Forking Lemma in the no-message attack model.
Lemma 3 Let S be an n-generic signature scheme with security parameter κ. Let
A be a PPT algorithm given only the public data as input. Assume that A, after
querying the n random oracles O1, . . . ,On polynomially often in κ, outputs a valid
signature (σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn) for message m with a non-negligible probability.
Let us consider a replay of this machine A with the same random tape (as a Turing
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machine), the same responses to the queries corresponding to O1, . . . ,On−1, but a
different output to exactly one query to On. Then running A and its reply results
in two valid signatures (σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn) and (σ0, . . . , σ
′
n, h1, . . . , h
′
n) for the
same message m and hn 6= h′n with a non-negligible probability.
Proof We are given a no-message adversary A, which is a PPT Turing machine
with a random tape ω taken from a set Rω. During the attack,Amay ask q1, . . . , qn
queries to random oracles O1, . . . ,On, respectively. We denote by q(i)1 , . . . , q(i)qi
the qi distinct queries to the random oracle Oi and let r(i) = (r(i)1 , . . . , r(i)qi ) be
the corresponding answers, where r
(i)
j is the answer to the j-th query to Oi, for
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ qi. Let Sqii denote the set of all possible answers from Oi,
thus (r
(i)
1 , . . . , r
(i)
qi ) ⊂ Sqii . Furthermore, we denote by
E : the event that A can produce a valid signature (σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn) for
message m by using random tape ω and the answers r
(i)
1 , . . . , r
(i)
qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Note that a valid signature implies hi = Oi(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hi−1, σi−1).
F : the event that A queried the oracle On on input (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1),
i.e.,
∃l ∈ {1, . . . , qn} : q(n)l = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1) .
Accordingly, its complement ¬F denotes
∀l ∈ {1, . . . , qn} : q(n)l 6= (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1) .
By hypothesis of the lemma, the probability that event E occurs is non-negligible,
namely there exists a polynomial function T (·) such that Pr[E ] ≥ 1T (κ) . We know
that
Pr[E ] = Pr[E ∧ F ] + Pr[E ∧ ¬F ] (1)
Furthermore, we get
Pr [hn = On(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1) ∧ ¬F ]
= Pr [hn = On(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1) | ¬F ] · Pr[¬F ]
≤ Pr [hn = On(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1) | ¬F ]
≤ 1
2κn
,
because the output of On is unpredictable and (m,σ0, . . . , σn−1) has a sufficient
min-entropy given the definition of n-generic signature. Event E implies that hn =
On(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1), and thus we get
Pr[E ∧ ¬F ] ≤ Pr [hn = On(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1) ∧ ¬F ] ≤ 1
2κn
(2)
Inequalities (1) and (2) lead to
Pr[E ∧ F ] ≥ 1
T (κ)
− 1
2κn
≥ 1
T ′(κ)
(3)
Note that a polynomial T ′(·) must exist since the difference between a non-
negligible and negligible term is non-negligible. Therefore, ∃l ∈ {1, . . . , qn} so
that
Pr
[
E ∧ q(n)l = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1)
]
≥ 1
qnT ′(κ)
.
Extended Security Arguments for Signature Schemes 9
Indeed, if we suppose that, ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , qn},
Pr
[
E ∧ q(n)l = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1)
]
<
1
qnT ′(κ)
then,
Pr[E ∧ F ] = Pr
[
E ∧ (∃j ≤ qn, q(n)j = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1))
]
≤
qn∑
j=1
Pr
[
E ∧ q(n)j = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1)
]
<
qn
qnT ′(κ)
=
1
T ′(κ)
This leads to a contradiction with (3). Further, we define
B = {(ω, r(1), . . . , r(n)) s.t. E ∧ q(n)l = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1)}.
Since, B ⊂ Rω × Sq11 × . . . × Sqnn and Pr[B] ≥ 1qnT ′(κ) , by using the splitting
lemma we have:
– ∃Ω ⊂ Rω such that Pr[ω ∈ Ω] ≥ 12qnT ′(κ) .
– ∀ω ∈ Ω, Pr
[
(ω, r(1), . . . , r(n)) ∈ B
]
≥ 12qnT ′(κ) , where the probability is taken
over Sq11 × . . .× Sqnn .
We define
B′ = {(ω, r(1), . . . , r(n)) s.t. (ω, r(1), . . . , r(n)) ∈ B ∧ ω ∈ Ω}.
Recall that r(i) = (r
(i)
1 , . . . , r
(i)
qi ) where r
(i)
j ∈ Si for 1 ≤ j ≤ qi. Since,
B′ ⊂ (Rω × Sq11 × . . .× Sl−1n )× Sqn−l+1n ,
by using the splitting lemma again we get
– ∃Ω′ ⊂ Rω × Sq11 × . . .× Sl−1n such that
Pr
[
(ω, r(1), . . . , r(n−1), (r(n)1 , . . . , r
(n)
l−1)) ∈ Ω′
]
≥ 14qnT ′(κ) .
– ∀(ω, r(1), . . . , r(n−1), (r(n)1 , . . . , r(n)l−1)) ∈ Ω′,
Pr
[
(ω, r(1), . . . , r(n−1), (r(n)1 , . . . , r
(n)
l−1, r
(n)
l , . . . , r
(n)
qn )) ∈ B′
]
≥ 14qnT ′(κ) ,
where the probability is taken over Sqn−l+1n .
As a result, if we choose l, ω, (r(1), . . . , r(n−1), (r(n)1 , . . . , r
(n)
l−1)), (r
(n)
l , . . . , r
(n)
qn ),
and (r′(n)l , . . . , r
′(n)
qn ) randomly, then we obtain two valid signatures
(σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn) and (σ0, . . . , σ
′
n, h1, . . . , h
′
n) for message m such that hn 6=
h′n with a non-negligible probability.3
uunionsq
3 Since l is the index of A’s query and there are only polynomially number of queries made
by A, our success probability remains non-negligible when picking l randomly.
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3.3 Extended Forking Lemma – Chosen-Message Attack Model
We now provide the Extended Forking Lemma in the adaptively chosen-message
attack model. In this model, an adversary may adaptively invoke a signing oracle
and is successful if it manages to compute a signature on a new message. If the
signing oracle outputs signatures which are indistinguishable from a genuine signer
without knowing the signing key, then using the simulator one can obtain two
distinct signatures with a suitable relation from a single signature, similarly to the
no-message scenario.
Theorem 1 (The Chosen-Message Extended Forking Lemma) Let S be an
n-generic signature scheme with security parameter κ. Let A be a PPT algorithm
given only the public data as input. Let us assume that A, after querying the n
random oracles O1, . . . ,On and the signer polynomially often in κ, can find a valid
signature (σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn) for message m with a non-negligible probability.
Then, there exists another PPT algorithm B that uses A as a subroutine, that
replaces interactions between A and its challenger by a simulation, and which pro-
vides with a non-negligible probability two valid signatures (σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn)
and (σ0, . . . , σ
′
n, h1, . . . , h
′
n) for the same message m such that hn 6= h′n.
Proof We consider a PPT algorithm B that executes A in such a way that B
simulates the environment of A. Therefore, B must simulate the interactions of A
with random oracles O1, . . . ,On and with the real signer. Then, we could see B as
an algorithm performing a no-message attack against the signature scheme S.
Let Sim denote the zero-knowledge simulator of S that can simulate the answers
of the real signer without knowledge of the secret key and has access to Oi (1 ≤
i ≤ n). Let A be an adaptively chosen-message adversary, which is a probabilistic
polynomial time Turing machine with a random tape ω taken from a set Rω.
During the attack, Amay ask q1, . . . , qn queries to random oracles O1, . . . ,On, and
qs queries (possibly repeated) to Sim. The values q1, . . . , qn and qs are polynomially
bounded in κ. We denote by q
(i)
1 , . . . , q
(i)
qi the qi distinct queries to the random
oracles Oi, and by m(1), . . . ,m(qs) the qs queries to the simulator Sim.
The simulator Sim answers a tuple (σ
(j)
0 , . . . , σ
(j)
n , h
(j)
1 , . . . , h
(j)
n ) as a signature
for a message m(j), for each integer j with 1 ≤ j ≤ qs. Then, the adversary A
assumes that h
(j)
i = Oi(m(j), σ(j)0 , h(j)1 , . . . , h(j)i−1, σ(j)i−1) holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
1 ≤ j ≤ qs, and stores all these relations.
Now we need to consider potential “collisions” of queries in the random oracles.
There are two kind of collisions that can appear. That is, (a) the simulator Sim
queries the random oracle with the same input the adversary has asked before (let
us denote this event by E1), and (b) Sim asks the same question repeatedly (let us
denote this event by E2).
We show that the probabilities of such events are negligible.
Pr[E1] = Pr[∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n};∃j ∈ {1, . . . , qs}; ∃t ∈ {1, . . . , qn}|
(m(j), σ
(j)
0 , h
(j)
1 , . . . , h
(j)
i−1, σ
(j)
i−1) = q
(i)
t ]
≤
n∑
i=1
qs∑
j=1
qn∑
t=1
Pr[(m(j), σ
(j)
0 , h
(j)
1 , . . . , h
(j)
i−1, σ
(j)
i−1) = q
(i)
t ] ≤
nqsqn
2κ
,
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which is negligible, assuming that the σi’s are random values drawn from a large
set with cardinality greater than 2κ.
Moreover, we have
Pr[E2] = Pr[∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n};∃j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . , qs} : j 6= j′ |
(m(j), σ
(j)
0 , h
(j)
1 , . . . , h
(j)
i−1, σ
(j)
i−1) = (m
(j′), σ
(j′)
0 , h
(j′)
1 , . . . , h
(j′)
i−1, σ
(j′)
i−1) ]
≤
n∑
i=1
qs∑
j=1
qs∑
j′ 6=j
Pr[(m(j), σ
(j)
0 , h
(j)
1 , . . . , h
(j)
i−1, σ
(j)
i−1)
= (m(j
′), σ
(j′)
0 , h
(j′)
1 , . . . , h
(j′)
i−1, σ
(j′)
i−1)] ≤
nq2s
2κ
,
which is also negligible.
Algorithm B succeeds whenever the machine A produces a valid signature
without any collisions. Hence, we have
Pr[B succeeds ] = Pr[A succeeds ]− Pr[E1]− Pr[E2] ≥ 1
T (κ)
− nqsqn
2κ
− nq
2
s
2κ
,
which is non-negligible.
Summing up, we have an algorithm B that performs a no-message attack
against the signature scheme S in polynomial time with non-negligible probability
of success. Thus, we can use Lemma 3 applied to algorithm B, and we will obtain
two valid signatures for the same message, such that hn 6= h′n again in polynomial
time.
uunionsq
4 Nested Forking Lemma
Contrary to the standard forking lemma [21], our extended forking lemma works
for n-generic signature schemes. These signatures contain n hash functions which
output h1, . . . , hn. In Theorem 1 we have shown that given an adversary which
outputs a forgery, we can obtain a second correlated one which differs in the last
hash output (hn 6= h′n) (and possibly σn 6= σ′n).
Here, we show that from an n-generic signature scheme and a forgery on mes-
sage m, one can actually derive 2n distinct signatures on message m for n log-
arithmically upper-bounded in the security parameter. To this end, we leverage
Lemma 2 and start by viewing the n-generic signature scheme as a 1-generic signa-
ture scheme. We derive recursively 2n forgeries by moving from hi to hi+1. That is,
at each level i for each adversary which outputs eventually a signature on a given
message m, we derive two new adversaries outputting two different signatures on
m, ending up with 2n distinct signatures on the same message m.
Theorem 2 (Nested Forking Lemma) Let S be an n-generic signature scheme
with security parameter 1κ. Let A be a PPT algorithm that is only given pub-
lic data as input. Let us assume that A, after querying the n random oracles
O1, . . . ,On and the signer polynomially often in κ, can find a valid signature
(σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn) for message m with a non-negligible probability. Then,
there exists another PPT algorithm B that uses A as a subroutine, that replaces
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interactions between A and its challenger by a simulation and which provides, with
a non-negligible probability, 2n valid signatures for the same message m. B outputs
signatures σ(i) of the form
σ(i) = (σ0, σ
(i)
1 , . . . , σ
(i)
n , h
(i)
1 , h
(i)
2 , . . . , h
(i)
n ),
where σ
(i)
k = σ
(i′)
k and h
(i)
k = h
(i′)
k for all i, i
′ where either log(i) > k or log(i′) > k,
and h
(i)
k 6= h(i
′)
k for all i, i
′ where log(i) ≤ k and log(i′) ≤ k, for k = 1, . . . , n and
i ∈ [1, 2n].
Proof We have shown in Lemma 2 that any n-generic signature scheme is also
an (n−1)-generic signature scheme. Consequently, by using a recursive argument,
any n-generic signature scheme can be interpreted as a 1-generic signature scheme,
where signatures are shaped as (σ0, h1, Σ1), with Σ1 = (σ1, . . . , σn, h2, . . . , hn).
Let S1 be the corresponding 1-generic signature scheme. Then any successful adver-
sary A against the unforgeability of S is also successful against the unforgeability
of S1 with identical success probability, and vice versa, because the signatures and
their verification algorithms are essentially identical.
The algorithm B leverages A and proceeds exactly as in the Extended Forking
Lemma on the signature scheme S1, but deviates from it in the following way. In-
stead letting the algorithm in the forking lemma output two signatures, it merely
will output the fresh one. Let A2 be the algorithm (i.e., the forger) which out-
puts the signature correlated to the signature of A, henceforth denoted by A1.
That is, B can make use of two forgers A1 and A2 which output valid signatures
(σ0, h
(1)
1 , Σ
(1)
1 ) and (σ0, h
(2)
1 , Σ
(2)
1 ), respectively, where h
(1)
1 6= h(2)1 .
Now, B repeats the process with both algorithms A1 and A2, in order to derive
two more forgers A3 and A4 which output valid signatures correlated to the ones
from A1 and A2. Hence, following the notation introduced in the statement of this
theorem, the four forgers output the following:
– A1 outputs (σ0, σ(1)1 , . . . , σ(1)n , h(1)1 , . . . , h(1)n ),
– A2 outputs (σ0, σ(2)1 , . . . , σ(2)n , h(2)1 , . . . , h(2)n ),
– A3 outputs (σ0, σ(3)1 , . . . , σ(3)n , h(3)1 , . . . , h(3)n ),
– A4 outputs (σ0, σ(4)1 , . . . , σ(4)n , h(4)1 , . . . , h(4)n ),
where (h
(1)
1 , σ
(1)
1 ) = (h
(3)
1 , σ
(3)
1 ) and (h
(2)
1 , σ
(2)
1 ) = (h
(4)
1 , σ
(4)
1 ). We stress that A2,
A3 and A4 output a valid signature with non-negligible probability if A does, a
claim that follows from Theorem 1.
The last step is repeated successively and the Extended Forking Lemma is
applied to obtain forgeries which differ in the very last hash value hi. In every
round i we obtain 2i−1 new forgers (and resp. forgeries), so that we end up with
2n correlated signatures of the form
σ(i) = (σ0, σ
(i)
1 , . . . , σ
(i)
n , h
(i)
1 , h
(i)
2 , . . . , h
(i)
n )
where σ
(i)
k = σ
(i′)
k and h
(i)
k = h
(i′)
k for all i, i
′ where either log(i) > k or log(i′) > k,
and h
(i)
k 6= h(i
′)
k for all i, i
′ where log(i) ≤ k and log(i′) ≤ k, for k = 1, . . . , n.
Figure 1 illustrates how those signatures are formed and generated. Basically,
algorithm B builds up a tree of correlated signatures starting from the given forger
Extended Security Arguments for Signature Schemes 13
A1,A2
A1,A3
A1,A5
A1,A9 A5,A13
A3,A7
A3,A11 A7,A15
A2,A4
A2,A6
A2,A10 A6,A14
A4,A8
A4,A12 A8,A16
h
(1)
1 6= h(2)1
h
(1)
1 h
(2)
1
h
(1)
1 = h
(3)
1
h
(1)
2 6= h
(3)
2
h
(1)
2 h
(3)
2
h
(1)
3 h
(5)
3 h
(3)
3 h
(7)
3
h
(1)
2 = h
(5)
2
h
(3)
2 = h
(7)
2
h
(1)
3 6= h
(5)
3
h
(3)
3 6= h
(7)
3
h
(2)
1 = h
(4)
1
h
(2)
2 6= h
(4)
2
h
(2)
2 h
(4)
2
h
(8)
3h
(4)
3h
(6)
3h
(2)
3
h
(2)
2 = h
(6)
2
h
(4)
2 = h
(8)
2
h
(2)
3 6= h
(6)
3
h
(4)
3 6= h
(8)
3
Fig. 1 Forking-Tree with depth 4 for a n-signature scheme. By Ai we denote the algorithm
(i.e., the forger) which outputs signature σ(i) = (σ0, σ
(i)
1 , . . . , σ
(i)
n , h
(i)
1 , h
(i)
2 , . . . , h
(i)
n ).
A (= A1). Theorem 1 guarantees that B given a forger will obtain black-box access
to an additional forger in polynomial time, where the latter’s probability to output
a valid signature is non-negligible as long as the former forger has non-negligible
advantage. Because B performs 2n−1 times the procedure of Theorem 1, as long
as n = o(log κ), B terminates in polynomial time.
uunionsq
5 Applications
In this section we first discuss a transformation from (2n + 1)-pass identification
protocols with a special structure to signature schemes that in many cases yields n-
generic signature schemes. This is essentially an extended Fiat-Shamir transform.
Then, we go on with two specific instances of the aforementioned transformation.
We derive two signature schemes whose security is shown by applying our results
from the previous section. These signatures are derived from the five-pass identi-
fication scheme based on MQ-problem, recently introduced in [23], and the q-SD
code-based five-pass identification scheme [8].
5.1 Security of n-generic Signature Schemes
Our aim is to prove that any n-generic signature scheme satisfying what we call
n-soundness is existentially unforgeable in the random-oracle model. To guar-
antee security under chosen-message attacks, and similarly to generic signature
schemes [21], we require a property from n-generic signature schemes that we call
n-soundness. Informally, n-soundness means that the secret key can be extracted
from 2n distinct valid signatures σ(i) = (σ0, σ
(i)
1 , . . . , σ
(i)
n , h
(i)
1 , h
(i)
2 , . . . , h
(i)
n ), where
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σ
(i)
k = σ
(i′)
k and h
(i)
k = h
(i′)
k for all i, i
′ where either log(i) > k or log(i′) > k),
and h
(i)
k 6= h(i
′)
k for all i, i
′ where log(i) ≤ k and log(i′) ≤ k, for k = 1, . . . , n and
i ∈ [1, 2n]. For n = 1 it is easy to see that the latter boils down to soundness as
originally defined in [21].
Definition 4 (n-Soundness) Let S = (KGen, Sign,Vf) be an n-generic signature
scheme. We call S n-sound, if there exists a PPT algorithm K, the knowledge
extractor, such that for any κ and m, any (sk, pk) ← KGen(1κ), any collection
of 2n distinct valid signatures σ(i) = (σ0, σ
(i)
1 , . . . , σ
(i)
n , h
(i)
1 , h
(i)
2 , . . . , h
(i)
n ), where
σ
(i)
k = σ
(i′)
k and h
(i)
k = h
(i′)
k for all i, i
′ where either log(i) > k or log(i′) > k,
and h
(i)
k 6= h(i
′)
k for all i, i
′ where log(i) ≤ k and log(i′) ≤ k, for k = 1, . . . , n and
i ∈ [1, 2n], we have sk← K(pk,m, σ(1), . . . , σ(2n)) with non-negligible probability.
Given an n-generic signature scheme, we associate to it the problem P of comput-
ing sk from pk such that Test(pk, sk) = 1. The following theorem states that all
n-generic signature schemes satisfying n-soundness are existentially unforgeable
under adaptively chosen-message attacks in the random-oracle model.
Theorem 3 (Security of n-Generic Signature Schemes) Let S be an n-
generic signature scheme satisfying n-soundness with underlying intractable hard
problem P. Let κ be the security parameter. Then, S is existentially unforgeable
under adaptively chosen-message attacks in the random-oracle model.
Proof We assume that the underlying problem P of the n-generic signature scheme
is hard, i.e., for all PPT algorithms A the probability to solve a hard instance of P
is negligible. Now, assume by contradiction, that S is not existentially unforgeable
under chosen-message attacks. That is, there exists a PPT algorithm B1 such
that B1 is able to output a signature σ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn) for a fresh
message m∗ with non-negligible probability. Then, due to the Extended Forking
Lemma (Theorem 1) and the Nested Forking Lemma (Theorem 2) from Section
3.3, one can construct a PPT algorithm B2 which outputs 2n correlated distinct
valid signatures σ(i) for i ∈ [1, 2n], all on the same message m, as required in the
statement of this theorem.
Due to the n-soundness of S, we know that there exists an “extractor” which,
starting from these 2n signatures on a message m, extracts the secret key. This
contradicts the assumption that the underlying problem P is hard, and by impli-
cation, we conclude that there cannot exist such a successful forger B1. uunionsq
5.2 n-Generic Signature Schemes derived from Identification Schemes
Our goal is to enlarge the class of identification protocols to which the Fiat-Shamir
transformation can be applied. We identify a potential set of candidates that we
name n-canonical identification schemes. By n-canonical identification we mean
schemes secure with respect to impersonation against passive attacks, where the
challenges are drawn from an uniform distribution in exponential-sized sets and
have 2n+ 1 moves.
Definition 5 (n-canonical Identification) An n-canonical identification scheme
IS = (K,P,V) is a (2n + 1)-pass interactive protocol. K and P = (P1, . . . ,Pn+1)
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are PPT algorithms whereas V = (ChSet,Vf) with ChSet being a PPT algorithm
and Vf being a deterministic boolean algorithm. These algorithms are defined as
follows:
K(1κ) upon input a security parameter 1κ, outputs a secret and public key pair
(sk, pk) and challenge spaces G1, . . . , Gn with 1/|Gi| negligible in 1κ.
P1(sk) upon input a secret key sk outputs the commitment R1.
Pi(sk, R1, C1, . . . , Ri−1, Ci−1) for i = 2, . . . , n, upon input a secret key sk and the
current transcript R1, C1, . . . , Ri−1, Ci−1, outputs the i-th commitment Ri.
Pn+1(sk, R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn) upon input a secret key sk and the current transcript
R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn, outputs a response Rsp.
ChSet(pk, i) upon input a public key pk and round number i, outputs a challenge
Ci ∈ Gi.
Vf(pk, R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn, Rsp) upon input a public key pk, and the current tran-
script R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn, Rsp, outputs either 1 (= valid) or 0 (= invalid).
We denote by 〈P(sk, pk),V(pk)〉 the transcript of an execution of an identification
scheme. An n-canonical identification scheme IS has the following properties:
Public-Coin. For any index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any (sk, pk, G1, . . . , Gn) ← K(1κ)
the challenge Ci ← ChSet(pk, i) is uniform in Gi.
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge. There exists a PPT algorithm Z, the zero-know-
ledge simulator, such that for any pair of PPT algorithms D = (D0, D1) the
following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
– Let (pk, sk, st)← D0(1κ). If Test(pk, sk) = 1, set
trans = (R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn, Rsp)← 〈P(sk, pk),V(pk)〉 ;
otherwise, set trans← ⊥. Output D1(trans, state).
– Let (pk, sk, st)← D0(1κ). If Test(pk, sk) = 1, set
trans = (R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn, Rsp)← Z(pk, 1) ;
otherwise set trans← Z(pk, 0). Output D1(trans, state).
Note that the definition of 1-canonical identification schemes is identical to that
of canonical identification schemes [1]. The Extended Fiat-Shamir transform that
we have put forward can be applied to n-canonical identification schemes, thus
yielding n-generic signature schemes. This is analogous to the original Fiat-Shamir
transform when applied to a 1-canonical identification scheme [21]. The idea of
this transformation consists on replacing the uniformly sampled challenges of the
verifier output by ChSet by the outputs of hash functions Hi : {0, 1}∗ → Gi
modeled as random oracles. More precisely, let IS = (K,P,V) be an n-canonical
identification scheme. The joint execution of P(sk, pk) and V(pk) then defines
an interactive protocol between the prover P and the verifier V. At the end of
the protocol V outputs a decision bit b ∈ {0, 1}. An n-generic signature scheme
S = (KGen,Sign,Vf) is derived as follows:
KGen(1κ) takes as input a security parameter 1κ and returns K(1κ).
Sign(sk,m) takes as input a secret key sk and a message m and returns the tran-
script 〈P(sk, pk),V(pk)〉 as the signature σ, i.e., σ = (σ0, h1, . . . , hn, σn) =
(R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn, Rsp), where Ci := Hi(m,R1, C1, . . . , Ri−1, Ci−1, Ri).
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Vf(pk,m, σ) takes as input a public key pk, a message m and a signature σ and
returns V.Vf(pk,m, σ) as the decision bit.4
The resulting scheme S is an n-generic signature scheme if R1, C1, . . . , Rn−1 has a
min-entropy of ω(|Hn|). Indeed, the obtained scheme S has the right structure and
the honest-verifier zero-knowledge property is guaranteed by (the similar property
of) the identification scheme.
However, it is still not guaranteed that S is existentially unforgeable. It lacks
then to check/prove that the resulting scheme S is n-sound. If this is the case then
one can apply Theorem 3 to obtain existential unforgeability against adaptive
chosen-message attacks.
Let us point out that the plain version of most identification protocols does
not directly satisfy the required security level by their choice of challenges spaces
G1, . . . , Gn. In particular, it might be the case that 1/|Gi| is not negligible in
the security parameter 1κ. For that reason, one should typically repeat the ID
protocol several (say δ) times until the desired security level is reached. In that case
the concatenation of δ transcripts 〈P(sk, pk),V(pk)〉 builds the signature (instead
of a single execution of the ID scheme). Note here that the challenges for all
protocol executions are computed by a single call to the hash function on input all
commitments. This is mandatory since, otherwise, the probability to forge grows
linearly with δ instead of exponentially. Moreover, for our security analysis, we
consider that the commitments Ri contain more entropy than kn, the output
size of the last hash function. This condition can be achieved by choosing their
domain as large as necessary. Note that in [21] it is assumed that R1 is uniformly
distributed over its corresponding set.
Many zero-knowledge identification schemes have been proposed, whose con-
version to signature schemes does not lead to generic signature schemes according
to the definition of Pointcheval and Stern [21]. Examples of such schemes are those
based on the Permuted Kernel Problem [24,17], the Permuted Perceptron Problem
[19,20], the Constrained Linear Equations [27], the five-pass variant of SD prob-
lem [26,2], the q-SD problem [8], the SIS problem [7,25] and the MQ-problem [23].
Fortunately, their conversion to signature schemes belong to the class of n-generic
signature schemes. Unlike [19,20], they even satisfy 2-soundness. Consequently, our
result for the security of n-generic signature schemes satisfying n-soundness car-
ries over to the resulting signature schemes derived from all these aforementioned
identification schemes in the random-oracle model.
Next, we provide the security argument for two resulting signature schemes.
The first one is obtained from the q-SD code-based identification scheme [8] and
the second one is derived from the MQ-based identification scheme [23]. For the
remaining aforementioned identification schemes the argument is formulated in a
very similar fashion. For this reason, we omit those proofs here.
5.3 The 5-pass q-SD Code-based Identification Scheme [8] and its Signature
At CRYPTO 1993, Stern proposed an efficient code-based identification scheme
using binary random codes, which is still today the reference in this area [26]. In
4 By V.Vf(pk,m, σ) we mean the verification algorithm performed by the verifier from the
underlying identification scheme IS.
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KeyGen:
Choose n, k, ω, and q such that WFISD(n, r, ω, q) ≥ 2κ
H
$←− Fr×nq
s
$←− Fnq , s.t. wt(s) = ω.
y ← HsT
Output (sk, pk) = (s, (y,H, ω))
Fig. 2 CVE key generation algorithm.
2010, Cayrel, Ve´ron, and El Yousfi presented in [8] a five-pass identification (q-SD)
scheme using q-ary codes instead of binary codes. The main achievement of this
proposal is to decrease the cheating probability of each round from 2/3 for Stern’s
scheme to 1/2 for their new scheme. This allows to decrease the communication
complexity by obtaining the same impersonation probability in fewer rounds com-
pared to Stern construction. Furthermore, the q-SD scheme is proven to satisfy
the zero-knowledge property and its security is based on the hardness of the q-ary
Syndrome Decoding problem.
In what follows, the elements of Fnq are written as n blocks of size dlog2(q)e = N
and each element of Fq as N bits. We denote by wt(v) the hamming weight of
vector v.
Before presenting the q-SD identification scheme, we first introduce a special
transformation that is used in the protocol.
Definition 6 Let Σ be a permutation of {1, . . . , n} and γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ Fnq
such that ∀i, γi 6= 0. We define the transformation Πγ,Σ as :
Πγ,Σ : Fnq −→ Fnq
v 7→ (γΣ(1)vΣ(1), . . . , γΣ(n)vΣ(n))
Notice that ∀α ∈ Fq, ∀v ∈ Fnq , Πγ,Σ(αv) = αΠγ,Σ(v), and wt(Πγ,Σ(v)) = wt(v).
The q-SD scheme consists of two parts: a key generation algorithm and an ID
protocol described in Figure 2 and 3, respectively. In the following we describe
these two parts.
The q-SD Key Generation Algorithm. Let κ be the security parameter and n, r =
n − k, ω be chosen accordingly. The q-SD scheme uses a random (r × n) q-ary
matrix H common to all users which can be considered to be the parity check
matrix of a random linear [n, k, ω] q-ary code. We can assume that H is described
as (Ir|R) where R is a random r × r matrix; as Gaussian elimination does not
change the code generated by H, there is no loss of generality. Figure 2 presents
the key generation algorithm.
The q-SD Protocol. The secret key holder can prove his knowledge of s by using
two blending factors: a random vector and a special transformation which has the
advantage to hide the non-zero values of the secret s. The security of the q-SD
scheme relies on the hardness of the syndrome decoding problem defined over Fq,
i.e., on the difficulty of determining the preimage s of y = HsT .
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Prover P Verifier V
(sk, pk) = (s, (y,H, ω))← KeyGen
(H public hash function)
u
$←− Fnq , Σ $←− Sn
γ
$←− Fn∗q
c1 ←H
(
Σ, γ,HuT
)
c2 ←H
(
Πγ,Σ(u), Πγ,Σ(s)
) c1, c2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
α←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− α $←− F∗q
β ← Πγ,Σ(u+ αs) β−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Challenge b←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− b $←− {0, 1}
If b = 0:
Σ, γ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c1 ?= H(Σ, γ,HΠ−1γ,Σ(β)T − αy)
Else:
Πγ,Σ(s)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c2 ?= H(β − αΠγ,Σ(s), Πγ,Σ(s)),
wt(Πγ,Σ(s))
?
= ω
Fig. 3 The CVE identification protocol
The resulting Signature Scheme. According to Section 5.2, the q-SD identification
scheme described above can be turned to an n-generic signature scheme S =
(KGen,Sign,Vf) as follows. Let δ be the number of rounds needed to achieve the
required impersonation resistance.
KGen(1κ) takes as input a security parameter 1κ and outputs K(1κ). The random
oracles O1 and O2 output elements of Fδq and {0, 1}δ, respectively.
Sign(sk,m) takes as input sk (as defined in Figure 2) and a message m, and com-
putes for all 1 ≤ i ≤ δ,
– c0,i = H
(
Σi, γi, Hu
T
i
)
, c1,i = H (Πγi,Σi(ui), Πγi,Σi(s)), and sets
σ0,i = (c0,i, c1,i), where ui
$←− Fnq , Σi $←− Sn, and γi $←− Fn∗q
– h1 = O1(m,σ0,1, . . . , σ0,δ) with h1 = (h1,1, . . . h1,δ) ∈ Fδq,
– σ1,i = Πγi,Σi(ui + h1,is),
– sets h2 = O2(m,σ0, h1, σ1), where σj = (σj,1, . . . , σj,δ) with 0 ≤ j ≤ 1,
h2 = (h2,1, . . . , h2,δ) ∈ {0, 1}δ,
– and finally, returns the signature σ for the message m as (σ0, h1, σ1, h2, σ2),
where σ2 = (σ2,1, . . . , σ2,δ) such that σ2,i = (γi, Σi) if h2,i = 0 and, other-
wise, σ2,i := Πγi,Σi(s) .
Vf(pk,m, σ) takes as input a public key pk (as defined in Figure 2), a message m
and a signature σ, and outputs 1 iff (σ0,1, . . . , σ0,δ) is well calculated as in the
ID protocol, i.e., the following respective equation is valid for all 1 ≤ i ≤ δ:
If h2,i = 0 : c0,i = H(Σi, γi, HΠ−1γi,Σi(σ1,i)T − h1,iy)
If h2,i = 1 : c1,i = H(σ1,i − h1,iΠγi,Σi(s), Πγi,Σi(s))
∧ wt(Πγi,Σi(s)) ?= ω .
Security Argument. To obtain this security reduction we will apply the Nested
Forking Lemma (Theorem 1) with n = 2. Firstly we see that the qSD signature
scheme is a 2-generic signature scheme. This is implied by the fact that it has
been obtained through the 5-pass Fiat-Shamir transform and that the original
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5-pass IS scheme is proven to be honest-verifier zero-knowledge in [8]. Let us
choose an integer j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ δ, and let us point out that every atomic
signature (σ0,j , h1,j , σ1,j , h2,j , σ2,j) can be also seen as a 2-signature scheme. Thus,
from a successful forger against the 2-generic qSD signature scheme, and for any
1 ≤ j ≤ δ, we obtain with non-negligible probability 4 distinct forgeries for the
same message m
– (σ0,j , σ
(1)
1,j , σ
(1)
2,j , h
(1)
1,j , h
(1)
2,j),
– (σ0,j , σ
(2)
1,j , σ
(2)
2,j , h
(2)
1,j , h
(2)
2,j),
– (σ0,j , σ
(3)
1,j , σ
(3)
2,j , h
(3)
1,j , h
(3)
2,j),
– (σ0,j , σ
(4)
1,j , σ
(4)
2,j , h
(4)
1,j , h
(4)
2,j),
where h
(1)
1,j 6= h(2)1,j , (h(1)1,j , σ(1)1,j ) = (h(3)1,j , σ(3)1,j ), (h(2)1,j , σ(2)1,j ) = (h(4)1,j , σ(4)1,j ), h(2)2,j 6= h(3)2,j
and h
(1)
2,j 6= h(2)4,j .
For each index j with 1 ≤ j ≤ δ, we have then
1. h
(1)
1,i 6= h(2)1,i (say h(1)1,i = α ∈ Fq and and h(2)1,i = α′ ∈ Fq)
2. h
(2)
2,j 6= h(3)2,j (say h(2)2,j = 0 and h(3)2,j = 1)
3. h
(1)
2,j 6= h(2)4,j (say h(1)2,j = 0 and h(2)4,j = 1)
Let (µ, τ), z¯, (µ′, τ ′), z˜ the values parsed from σ(1)2,i , σ
(2)
2,i , σ
(3)
2,i , σ
(4)
2,i , and let us
rename σ1,j := σ
(1)
1,j = σ
(3)
1,j and σ
′
1,j := σ
(2)
1,j = σ
(4)
1,j . Then, since σ0,i is fixed for
the 4 atomic signatures :
c0,i = H(m,µ, τ,HΠµ,τ−1(σ1,i)− αy) = H(m,µ′, τ ′, HΠµ′,τ ′−1(σ′1,i)− α′y)
c1,i = H(σ1,i − αz¯, z¯) = H(σ′1,i − α′z˜, z˜) and ω(z¯) = ω(z˜) = ω
Hence either we have found a collision for the hash function or
µ = µ′, τ = τ ′, z¯ = z˜, σ1,i − σ′1,i = (α− α′)z¯
HΠµ,τ
−1(σ1,i − σ′1,i) = (α− α′)y
frow which we deduce that
Hz¯ = y and ω(z¯) = p
which is a solution to the SD problem. This proves the existence of an extractor
as specified in 2-soundness. The latter property, together with 2-generic signature
property, imply by virtue of Theorem 3, that our q-SD signature scheme is exis-
tentially unforgeable under the hardness of the syndrome decoding problem in the
random oracle model. uunionsq
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Prover P(s, v) Verifier V(v)
r0, t0
$←− Fnq , e0 $←− Fmq
r1 ← s− r0
c0 ← Com (r0, t0, e0)
c1 ← Com (r1, G(t0, r1) + e0) c0, c1−−−−−−−−−−−→
α←−−−−−−−−−−− α $←− Fq
t1 ← αr0 − t0
e1 ← αF (r0)− e0
(t1, e1)−−−−−−−−−−−→
b←−−−−−−−−−−− b $←− {0, 1}
If b = 0:
r0−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c0 ?= Com(r0, αr0 − t1,
αF (r0)− e1)
Else:
r1−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c1 ?= Com(r1, α(v − F (r1))
−G(t1, r1)− e1)
Fig. 4 The five-pass MQ identification scheme
5.4 The 5-pass MQ Identification Scheme [23] and its Signature
Recently at CRYPTO 2011, Sakumoto et al. presented a five-pass identification
scheme based on multivariate quadratic polynomials [23]. Assuming the existence
of a non-interactive commitment scheme Com which should be statistically hiding
and computationally binding, the authors of [23] showed that their scheme is an
honest-verifier zero-knowledge identification scheme. Actually, 2-soundness is also
satisfied, as we will see below.
First, we briefly describe the identification scheme [23]; then, we detail the
procedure to convert it into a signature scheme using Section 5.2; finally, we analyze
the security of the obtained signature scheme using the Extended Forking Lemma
from Section 3.3.
Let n,m and q be positive integers. We denote by MQ(n,m,Fq) a family of
functions{
F (x) = (f1(x), · · · , fm(x)) : fl(x) =
∑
i,j al,i,jxixj +
∑
i bl,ixi,
al,i,j , bl,i ∈ Fq for l = 1, . . . ,m
}
where x = (x1, · · · , xn). An element F ofMQ(n,m,Fq) is called an MQ function
and a function G(x, y) = F (x+ y)− F (x)− F (y) is called the polar form of F .
Let κ be a security parameter. Let n = n(κ),m = m(κ) and q = q(κ) be poly-
nomially bounded functions. The key-generation algorithm K of this identification
scheme can be described as follows. It takes 1κ as input and creates a system pa-
rameter F ∈ MQ(n,m,Fq) which consists of an m-tuple of random multivariate
quadratic polynomials. Then, it randomly chooses a vector s ∈ Fnq (secret key),
and computes the corresponding public key v := F (s). Finally, it outputs the
key pair (pk, sk) = (v, s). Figure 4 illustrates the interaction protocol between the
prover and the verifier.
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The resulting Signature Scheme. We will use the results from Section 5.2 to turn
the MQ-based identification scheme described above can into a 2-generic signature
scheme S = (KGen,Sign,Vf) as follows. Let δ be the number of rounds needed to
achieve the required impersonation resistance.
KGen(1κ) takes as input a security parameter 1κ and outputs K(1κ). The random
oracles O1 and O2 output elements of Fδq and {0, 1}δ, respectively, and are
obtained by a parallel computation of random oracles O1,i,O2,i for 1 ≤ i ≤ δ.
Sign(sk,m) takes as input sk and a message m, and computes for all 1 ≤ i ≤ δ,
– r1,i = s− r0,i where r0,i $←− Fnq ,
– c0,i = Com (r0,i, t0,i, e0,i) , c1,i = Com (r1,i, G(t0,i, r1,i) + e0,i), and sets
σ0,i = (c0,i, c1,i), where t0,i
$←− Fnq and e0,i $←− Fmq ,
– h1 = O1(m,σ0,1, . . . , σ0,δ) = (h1,1, . . . h1,δ) ∈ Fδq where h1,i := O1,i(m,σ0,1,
. . . , σ0,δ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ δ,
– (t1,i, e1,i) = (h1,i · r0,i − t0,i, h1,i · F (r0,i)− e0,i) and sets σ1,i = (t1,i, e1,i),
– sets h2 = (h2,1, . . . , h2,δ) = O2(m,σ0, h1, σ1), where σj = (σj,1, . . . , σj,δ)
and h2,i := O2,i(m,σ0, h1, σ1) for 0 ≤ j ≤ 1 and 1 ≤ i ≤ δ,
– and finally, returns the signature σ for the message m as (σ0, h1, σ1, h2, σ2),
where σ2 = (σ2,1, . . . , σ2,δ) such that σ2,i := r0,i if h2,i = 0 and, otherwise,
σ2,i := r1,i.
Vf(pk,m, σ) takes as input a public key pk, a message m and a signature σ =
(σ0, h1, σ1, h2, σ2). It parses
σ0 =
(
(c0,1, c1,1), . . . , (c0,δ, c1,δ)
)
,
h1 = (h1,1, . . . h1,δ) ∈ Fδq,
σ1 =
(
(t1,1, e1,1), . . . , (t1,δ, e1,δ)
) ∈ (Fnq × Fmq )δ ,
h2 = (h2,1, . . . , h2,δ) ∈ {0, 1}δ,
σ2 = (σ2,1, . . . , σ2,δ) ,
and outputs 1 iff the following equation is valid for all 1 ≤ i ≤ δ:
If h2,i = 0 : c0,i = Com (σ2,i, h1,i · σ2,i − t1,i, h1,i · F (σ2,i)− e1,i) .
If h2,i = 1 : c1,i = Com (σ2,i, h1,i(v − F (σ2,i))−G(t1,i, σ2,i)− e1,i) .
Security Argument5. To obtain this security reduction we will apply the Nested
Forking Lemma (Theorem 1) with n = 2. Firstly we see that the MQ signature
scheme is a 2-generic signature scheme. This is implied by the fact that it has
been obtained through the 5-pass Fiat-Shamir transform and that the original
5-pass IS scheme is proven to be honest-verifier zero-knowledge in [23]. Let us
choose an integer j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ δ, and let us point out that every atomic
signature (σ0,j , h1,j , σ1,j , h2,j , σ2,j) can be also seen a 2-signature scheme. Thus,
from a successful forger against the 2-generic MQ signature scheme, and for any
1 ≤ j ≤ δ, we obtain with non-negligible probability 4 distinct forgeries for the
same message m
– (σ0,j , σ
(1)
1,j , σ
(1)
2,j , h
(1)
1,j , h
(1)
2,j),
– (σ0,j , σ
(2)
1,j , σ
(2)
2,j , h
(2)
1,j , h
(2)
2,j),
5 In the conference version of this work [3] a simpler security argument was given that turned
out be flawed.
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– (σ0,j , σ
(3)
1,j , σ
(3)
2,j , h
(3)
1,j , h
(3)
2,j),
– (σ0,j , σ
(4)
1,j , σ
(4)
2,j , h
(4)
1,j , h
(4)
2,j),
where h
(1)
1,j 6= h(2)1,j , (h(1)1,j , σ(1)1,j ) = (h(3)1,j , σ(3)1,j ), (h(2)1,j , σ(2)1,j ) = (h(4)1,j , σ(4)1,j ), h(2)2,j 6= h(3)2,j
and h
(1)
2,j 6= h(2)4 . Thus we obtain for each j-th atomic signature four forgeries
satisfying the conditions stated in Theorem 5 in [23], for 1 ≤ j ≤ δ. This implies
that any attacker against our signature scheme can be turned with non-negligible
probability into a solver of the MQ problem or into an attacker against the binding
property of the commitment scheme in the random oracle model. uunionsq
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